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Abstract
This paper builds on the recent work of Groote Schaarsberg, Rei-
jnierse and Borm (2018) on mutual liability problems. In essence, a
mutual liability problem comprises a financial network in which agents
may have both monetary individual assets and mutual liabilities. Here
mutual liabilities reflect rightful monetary obligations from past bi-
lateral transactions. To settle these liabilities by reallocating the in-
dividual assets, mutual liability rules are analyzed that are based on
centralized bilateral transfer schemes which use a certain bankruptcy
rule as its leading allocation mechanism.
In this paper we derive a new characterization of mutual liabil-
ity rules by taking a decentralized approach instead, which is based
on a recursive individual settlement procedure. We show that for
bankruptcy rules that satisfy composition, this decentralized proce-
dure always leads to the same allocation as the one prescribed by the
corresponding mutual liability rule based on centralized bilateral trans-
fer schemes.
Keywords: Mutual liability rules, individual settlement allocation pro-
cedure, decentralization, composition property.
JEL Classification Number: C71, G33.
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1 Introduction
The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 sparked widespread despair among
American consumers and firms about their investments. In fact, the confi-
dence of American investors in the financial system was shaken to such an
extent that it ultimately led to a wave of bank runs which put the solvency
of banks at risk. When facing a bank run, banks often need to liquidate
their assets, such as their outstanding loans to other banks, because banks
typically hold a fraction of deposits as cash reserves. This can have dire
consequences when bank runs occur simultaneously. For example, in the
United States the number of operating banks nearly halved from 1929 to
1933 (Bernanke, 1983). In addition, the fact that highly intertwined finan-
cial institutions wish to liquidate their assets and settle their claims brings
about a practical problem too: how can one allocate the total available as-
sets of the financial institutions among them? Although bank runs were not
as apparent during the most recent global financial and banking crises be-
tween mid 2007 and early 2009, the allocation problem remains relevant. In
September 2008 the financial stress reached a peak when Lehman Brothers,
at that time the fourth-largest investment bank in the United States, filed
for bankruptcy. Had it not been for governments bailing out other financial
institutions in financial distress, the financial system would have been on
the verge of collapse.1
The allocation issue described above can be modeled as a mutual liability
problem as introduced by Groote Schaarsberg, Reijnierse, and Borm (2018).
Mutual liability problems are a generalization of the well-studied notion of a
bankruptcy problem as introduced by O’Neill (1982). In a bankruptcy prob-
lem there is a single non-negative monetary estate that has to be allocated
among a finite set of claimants, where each claimant has a non-negative
claim on the estate. In order to determine an allocation of the estate, one
can use so-called bankruptcy rules. Such rules prescribe for each bankruptcy
problem how to allocate the estate among the claimants. For an extensive
survey on bankruptcy rules and their properties, see Thomson (2003, 2013,
2015).
In a similar fashion, mutual liability problems can be represented by a
non-negative estate vector containing each agent’s monetary estate and a
non-negative claims matrix where entries indicate liabilities between (or-
dered) pairs of agents. In other words, a mutual liability problem comprises
1Mathiason, N. (2008, December 28). Three weeks that changed the world. The
Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/business
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a financial network of economic agents (like banks) that interact by means
of monetary transactions. Furthermore, as result of these interactions, each
agent has assets, debtors and creditors. Mutual liability rules prescribe
for each mutual liability problem how to allocate the total available estate
among the agents. An example of a mutual liability rule is a ϕ-based mutual
liability rule that relies on a specific bankruptcy rule ϕ. In fact, ϕ-based mu-
tual liability rules will be the focus of this paper. A ϕ-based mutual liability
rule put forward by Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2018) prescribes that, for
each mutual liability problem, the final allocation of the total estate should
be the direct consequence of a ϕ-transfer scheme of bilateral payments that
satisfies an internal consistency property.
This paper builds on the work of Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2018) and
provides new insights into ϕ-based mutual liability rules. The approach of
Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2018) can be regarded as a centralized mech-
anism, i.e. an independent authority is assigned the task to allocate the
total estate among the agents. We move away from this and look at mu-
tual liability rules from a decentralized perspective instead. This perspective
is particularly interesting in light of recent discussions about privacy. For
instance, agents may rather not fully disclose their debts. We show that
agents can take matters into their own hands and still reach a consensus on
how to allocate the total estate when using a ϕ-based individual settlement
allocation procedure. In this recursive procedure agents settle their claims
individually, that is, in each step of the recursion the estate of each agent is
reallocated by using a fixed specific bankruptcy rule ϕ. As a result of these
individual reallocations, the total estate is reallocated and, correspondingly,
mutual liabilities are reduced. This procedure terminates in finitely many
steps if no further reallocations occur in a certain step. Nevertheless, such
a step need not exist. We prove that, if reallocations go on indefinitely,
the sequence of estate vectors that is generated by the individual settlement
allocation procedure has a limit.
In Csóka and Herings (2017, 2018) bankruptcy rules also form the basis
for payment matrices, which then, in fact, are viewed as solutions to mutual
liability problems. Csóka and Herings (2017) focus on the proportional rule
and corresponding payment matrices in particular, for which they provide
an axiomatization. Moreover, Csóka and Herings (2018) take a recursive
decentralized approach to mutual liability problems. Their idea of decen-
tralization differs from ours, that is, in each step one agent is selected that
has to make payments to other agents. Therefore, agent-specific payments
occur sequentially instead of simultaneously. Again, they put emphasis on
payment matrices rather than on the resulting allocation.
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Interestingly, there is a particular property of a bankruptcy rule that
bridges the gap between the allocation prescribed by a ϕ-based mutual li-
ability rule and the outcome of the corresponding individual settlement al-
location procedure. Our main result is that these allocations coincide when
one applies bankruptcy rules that satisfy composition.2 If a bankruptcy rule
satisfies composition, then, in any bankruptcy problem, the allocation re-
mains the same when first allocating an estimate of the estate which is lower
than the realization and next, allocating the surplus estate.
Finally, this paper introduces a new reduction method for mutual lia-
bility problems, which is based on the concept of bankruptcy-stable sets. A
bankruptcy stable set consists of agents that can already pay off all their
debts by receiving their full claim on agents within the same set. As these
agents do not rely on agents outside of the set, we let them settle all claims
first. We prove that any ϕ-based mutual liability rule is invariant with
respect to a reduction on a bankruptcy stable set.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review bankruptcy
problems, mutual liability problems and ϕ-based mutual liability rules. It
also contains the leading example that is used throughout this paper. Next,
Section 3 introduces and discusses the individual settlement allocation proce-
dure and contains our main result. Finally, Section 4 discusses the invariance
of ϕ-based mutual liability rules on bankruptcy-stable sets.
2 Bankruptcy and mutual liability problems
In a bankruptcy problem each claimant i within a finite set N has a non-
negative justifiable claim ci on a common non-negative estate e that has
to be allocated among these claimants.3 When the estate is insufficient to
cover all claims, a natural, leading question is how to allocate the estate
among the claimants in an adequate way. So-called bankruptcy rules are a
helpful tool in answering this question as each of such rules prescribes a way
to solve any bankruptcy problem. Let BN denote the set of all bankruptcy
problems (e, c), with c = (ci)i∈N , on N . A bankruptcy rule ϕ : BN → RN+
assigns to each bankruptcy problem (e, c) ∈ BN a non-negative allocation
2We adopt the terminology of Herrero and Villar (2001). Thomson (2003, 2013, 2015)
refers to this property as composition up.
3Essentially, we consider claims problems since we do not assume
∑
i∈N ci ≥ e, which
is standard for bankruptcy problems. Nonetheless, we stick to bankruptcy problem ter-
minology.
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vector ϕ(e, c) ∈ RN+ such that∑
j∈N




and ϕj(e, c) ≤ cj for all j ∈ N . In addition, we assume that a bankruptcy
rule satisfies estate monotonicity.
Definition 2.1. A bankruptcy rule ϕ satisfies estate monotonicity if for all
(e, c) ∈ BN and (e′, c) ∈ BN with e ≤ e′ it holds that ϕ(e, c) ≤ ϕ(e′, c).
Estate monotonicity states that no claimant should receive less than what
he did receive initially when it turns out there is more to be allocated. A
well-known implication of estate monotonicity of a bankruptcy rule is that
the bankruptcy rule is continuous in the estate.
Definition 2.2. A bankruptcy rule ϕ satisfies estate continuity if for all
(e, c) ∈ BN and for any sequence of non-negative estates {ek}∞k=1 that con-
verges to e, the sequence {ϕ(ek, c)}∞k=1 converges to ϕ(e, c).
For an extensive survey of bankruptcy rules see Thomson (2003, 2013,
2015). In this paper we focus our attention on the constrained equal awards
rule CEA and the Talmud rule τ . The constrained equal awards rule CEA
allocates the estate as equally as possible among the claimants provided that
the allocation to each claimant is not more than what he claims. It is, for
all (e, c) ∈ BN , defined by
CEAi(e, c) = min{ci, λ}
for all i ∈ N with λ ∈ R such that
∑
j∈N min{cj , λ} = min{e,
∑
j∈N cj}.
The Talmud rule τ (Aumann & Maschler, 1985) is, for all (e, c) ∈ BN ,
























For our purpose, we consider two additional bankruptcy rule properties.
First, the concede-and-divide CD principle.
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Definition 2.3. A bankruptcy rule ϕ satisfies concede-and-divide if for all
(e, c) ∈ BN with N = {1, 2} it holds that ϕ(e, c) = CD(e, c) with
CD1 = max{e− c2, 0}+




CD2 = max{e− c1, 0}+
e−max{e− c1, 0} −max{e− c2, 0}
2
.
Concede-and-divide states that in a bankruptcy problem with two claimants
both first get the amount not claimed by the other claimant after which
the remaining estate is allocated equally. The Talmud rule τ does satisfy
concede-and-divide while the constrained equal awards rule CEA does not.
Second, the composition principle.
Definition 2.4. A bankruptcy rule ϕ satisfies composition if for all (e, c) ∈
BN and all e′ ≤ e it holds that
ϕ(e, c) = ϕ(e′, c) + ϕ(e− e′, c− ϕ(e′, c)).
If a bankruptcy rule satisfies composition, then this property ensures that
in any bankruptcy problem the allocation remains the same when first allo-
cating an estimate of the estate which is lower than the realization and next,
allocating the surplus estate. In contrast to concede-and-divide, the Talmud
rule τ does not satisfy composition while the constrained equal awards rule
CEA does.
A mutual liability problem can be represented by a triple (N,E,C) where
N denotes a finite set of agents; E = (ei)i∈N ∈ RN+ denotes a non-negative
estates vector where coordinate ei indicates the estate belonging to agent i;
C = (cij)i,j∈N ∈ RN×N+ denotes a non-negative claims matrix where cell cij
indicates the claim of agent j on agent i, i 6= j, and cii = 0 for all i ∈ N . In
other words, each agent i ∈ N has a non-negative estate ei, at most |N | − 1
creditors as represented by positive numbers in the i-th row of C, and at
most |N | − 1 debtors as represented by positive numbers in the i-th column
of C. Note that there is no condition on the relation between the claims cij
and cji with i 6= j. The set of all mutual liability problems on N is denoted
by LN . A mutual liability rule µ : LN → RN+ assigns to each mutual liability







Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2018) present a method of solving mutual
liability problems that makes use of so-called payment matrices. A payment
matrix is a non-negative matrix P = (pij)i,j∈N where cell pij indicates the
payment of agent i to agent j. When a bankruptcy rule ϕ forms the ba-
sis for such a payment matrix, it is called a (bilateral) ϕ-transfer scheme.
In a ϕ-transfer scheme the payments adhere to a specific form of internal
consistency.
Definition 2.5. Let (E,C) ∈ LN and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. For all
i ∈ N let c̄i ∈ RN+ indicate the i-th row of claims matrix C. The payment
matrix P = (pij) ∈ RN×N+ is called a ϕ-transfer scheme for (E,C) if, for all
i ∈ N ,
pij = ϕj(ei +
∑
m∈N
pmi , c̄i) (2.1)
for all j ∈ N . The set of all possible ϕ-transfer schemes for (E,C) is denoted
by Pϕ(E,C).




pmi , c̄i) ∈ BN
is the bankruptcy problem corresponding to agent i ∈ N , and additionally
that, for all i ∈ N ,
pii = 0
since (c̄i)i = cii = 0. A ϕ-transfer scheme is internally consistent in the
following sense. The amount agent i ∈ N pays to agent j ∈ N follows from
the allocation vector provided by ϕ of the bankruptcy problem in which the
estate equals the current estate ei of agent i plus the amount
∑
m∈N pmi
agent i receives from the other agents and with claims vector c̄i as given
by the i-th row of C. Clearly, in any ϕ-transfer scheme P = (pij)i,j∈N ∈
Pϕ(E,C)
0 ≤ pij ≤ cij
for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and ∑
j∈N





for all i ∈ N .
A ϕ-transfer scheme P ∈ Pϕ(E,C) can directly be translated into a
transfer allocation vector αP ∈ RN+ , given by







for all i ∈ N . Hence, in a transfer allocation vector the allocation to an agent
equals his estate plus his net payments. Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2018)
show that there always exists at least one ϕ-transfer scheme and that all
ϕ-transfer schemes corresponding with a mutual liability problem yield the
same transfer allocation vector.
Theorem 2.1 (cf. Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2018)). Let (E,C) ∈ LN and
let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. Then,
(i) Pϕ(E,C) 6= ∅,
(ii) P 1, P 2 ∈ Pϕ(E,C) =⇒ αP 1 = αP 2.
Therefore, the resulting allocation vector is only based on the bankruptcy
rule and not on the exact ϕ-transfer scheme.
Definition 2.6. Let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. The ϕ-based mutual liability
rule ρϕ : LN → RN+ is defined by setting, for all (E,C) ∈ LN ,
ρϕ(E,C) = αP ,
where P is a ϕ-transfer scheme for (E,C).
The following example explicitly computes the allocation vector ρτ (E,C)
prescribed by the τ -based mutual liability rule for a specific mutual liability
problem with three agents. In fact, the mutual liability problem of Example
2.1 is the leading mutual liability problem throughout this paper.





, and C =

1 2 3
1 0 1 2
2 1 0 1
3 5 2 0
.
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In this problem agent 1 has an estate of 2 while agents 2 and 3 both have an
estate of 1. Neither of the agents has sufficient funds to pay off all debts on
their own. Thus, each agent is dependent on payments from others. Agent
1 owes 1 to agent 2 and 2 to agent 3. Agent 2 owes 1 to both agents 1 and
3. Agent 3 owes 5 to agent 1 and 2 to agent 2.
A τ -transfer scheme P = (pij)i,j∈N can be obtained by considering the
three conditions imposed by (2.1):
(p11, p12, p13) = τ(2 + p21 + p31, (0, 1, 2)) (Agent 1)
(p21, p22, p23) = τ(1 + p12 + p32, (1, 0, 1)) (Agent 2)
(p31, p32, p33) = τ(1 + p13 + p23, (5, 2, 0)). (Agent 3)
Hence, obviously 
p11 = p22 = p33 = 0,
p12 ≤ 1, p13 ≤ 2,
p21 ≤ 1, p23 ≤ 1,
p31 ≤ 5, p32 ≤ 2.
Because agents pay nothing to and claim nothing from themselves, solv-
ing a three-agent bankruptcy problem boils down to solving a two-agent
bankruptcy problem. As a result, we apply the concede-and-divide princi-
ple.
With respect to agent 3, note that 0 ≤ p13 + p23 ≤ 3. Additionally,
suppose that p13 + p23 ≥ 1, then
(p31, p32) = CD(1 + p13 + p23, (5, 2))




= (p13 + p23, 1).
Hence, p32 = 1. Agent 2 needs to receive at least a total payment of 1 to pay
all his debts. Hence, for agent 2 we now get (p21, p23) = (1, 1). Likewise,
for agent 1 we then get (p12, p13) = (1, 2). Finally, we get p31 = p13 + p23 =
2 + 1 = 3. A τ -transfer scheme for (E,C) is thus equal to
P =
0 1 21 0 1
3 1 0
 .
Correspondingly, the transfer allocation is equal to
ρτ (E,C) = (2 + 4− 3, 1 + 2− 2, 1 + 3− 4) = (3, 1, 0).
4
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3 Individual settlement allocation procedure
As Example 2.1 shows, computing ϕ-transfer schemes can be complex in
general as we typically deal with them on an ad hoc basis. Nonetheless,
Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2018) show that for a special subclass of mutual
liability problems, so-called hierarchical mutual liability problems, ϕ-transfer
schemes can be determined recursively. We will build on this recursive ap-
proach, albeit we extend it to general mutual liability problems and base it
on a decentralized mechanism. Roughly speaking, given a bankruptcy rule ϕ,
in each step of the recursion each agent independently solves a bankruptcy
problem using ϕ to determine his payments to others. The estate vector
and claims matrix can be updated accordingly as a consequence of these
payments. The result is a new mutual liability problem to which the same
procedure can be applied. The recursive procedure is formally defined in
Definition 3.1 and hereafter referred to as the individual settlement alloca-
tion procedure, or ISAP in short.
Definition 3.1. Let (E,C) ∈ LN and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. The indi-
vidual settlement allocation procedure generates a sequence of estate vectors
{Ek}k∈N, a sequence of claims matrices {Ck}k∈N and a sequence of payment
matrices {Φk}k∈N with Φk = (Φkij)i,j∈N in the following way:
1. Initially, set E1 = (e1i )i∈N = E and C
1 = (c1ij)i,j∈N = C
Then, recursively for k = 2, 3, . . .







where c̄k−1i ∈ RN+ is the i-th row of claims matrix Ck−1

















Note that in the ISAP there are no further subsequent updates if at some
step k ∈ N either eki = 0 or c̄ki = 0 for all i ∈ N . Yet this need not always
happen, in which case updates go on indefinitely. The next theorem shows
that these updates are negligible in the limit. In other words, the sequence
of estate vectors {Ek}k∈N that is generated by the ISAP has a limit.
Theorem 3.1. Let (E,C) ∈ LN be a mutual liability problem and let ϕ be
a bankruptcy rule. Then, the limit of the sequence {Ek}k∈N generated by the
individual settlement allocation procedure exists.
Proof. In each step k ∈ {2, 3, . . . } of the ISAP |N | bankruptcy problems are








for all i, j ∈ N . By definition of a bankruptcy rule,
0 ≤ ϕj(ek−1i , c̄
k−1
i ) ≤ c
k−1
ij
for all k ∈ {2, 3, . . . } and for all i, j ∈ N . Hence,
0 ≤ ckij ≤ ck−1ij
for all k ∈ {2, 3, . . . } and for all i, j ∈ N . Therefore, for all i, j ∈ N , the
sequence {ckij}k∈N is non-increasing and bounded from below by zero. Thus,
by the Monotone Convergence Theorem for sequences, this sequence has a
limit. Note that in step k ∈ N the estate of agent i ∈ N is equal to
eki = · · · = e1i +
∑
j∈N





(c1ij − ckij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
. (3.1)
That is, before step k agent i ∈ N has received (1) and has paid (2) to





j ∈ N . This implies that also the limit of the sequence {eki }k∈N exists for
every i ∈ N .
Thus, as a result of Theorem 3.1, for every bankruptcy rule ϕ, the ISAP
leads to a new type of mutual liability rule, called the recursive ϕ-based
mutual liability rule, in the following way.
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Definition 3.2. Let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. The corresponding recursive
ϕ-based mutual liability rule rϕ : LN → RN+ is defined by setting, for all




where {Ek}k∈N is the sequence generated by the ISAP on (E,C) ∈ LN with
respect to ϕ.
Next, we provide an alternative characterization of the allocation vector
prescribed by a recursive ϕ-based mutual liability rule which is based on
payment matrices.
Lemma 3.1. Let (E,C) ∈ LN , let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule, and let the





for all i, j ∈ N , where {Φk}k∈N is the sequence of payment matrices gener-
ated by the ISAP in (E,C) with respect to ϕ. Then, rϕ(E,C) = αP .
Proof. Let {Ek}k∈N be the sequence of estate vectors generated by the ISAP
on (E,C) with respect to ϕ and let Ek = (eki )i∈N . Let i ∈ N and m ∈
{2, 3, . . . }. By definition of the ISAP we have that











Hence, for all i ∈ N ,






































The ISAP is illustrated in the following two examples.
Example 3.1. Reconsider the mutual liability problem (E,C) ∈ LN of




 , and C =
0 1 21 0 1
5 2 0
 .
We explicitly compute the allocation vector rτ (E,C) prescribed by the re-

































































































































































































Now the first two rows of C3 are zero, that is, agents 1 and 2 are debt free.
On the other hand, agent 3 has a positive estate and outstanding debts.
Hence, we only have to consider the reallocation of the estate of agent 3.
Since τ(1, (314 ,
3




8 , 0), we have
Φ3 =

















































Clearly, in subsequent steps nothing changes because now e43 = 0, i.e.0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 = Φ4 = Φ5 = . . .
such that E4 = E5 = . . . and C4 = C5 = . . . . Thus, the allocation vector
rτ (E,C) is obtained in a finite number of steps:







In Example 2.1, the allocation vector prescribed by the τ -based mutual
liability rule was shown to be equal to ρτ (E,C) = (3, 1, 0). Note that
ρτ (E,C) 6= rτ (E,C).
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The following example illustrates that the allocation vector rϕ(E,C) pre-
scribed by the ϕ-based mutual liability rule will not always be attained in a
finite number of steps.
Example 3.2. Consider the mutual liability problem (E,C) ∈ LN with




 , and C =
0 1 11 0 1
0 0 0
 .
Due to the structure of C, both the constrained equal awards rule and the
Talmud rule prescribe that in each step of the ISAP the estate of agents 1
and 2 will be allocated equally among their two claimants, which implies
that both receive half of their estate. Moreover, in each step of the ISAP
agent 3 receives half the estate of both agents 1 and 2, but at the same time

















and the ISAP takes an infinite number of steps. It readily follows that
rτ (E,C) = rCEA(E,C) = (0, 0, 3).
4
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As seen in Examples 2.1 and 3.1, ρϕ(E,C) and rϕ(E,C) can differ. The
reason for this is that, in contrast to ρϕ(E,C), rϕ(E,C) entails partitioning
a mutual liability problem into a series of sub-problems. In the individual
settlement allocation procedure the ultimate payment an agent makes is the
sum of payments in each sub-problem (cf. Lemma 3.1). On the other hand,
payments that follow from a ϕ-transfer scheme are determined by solving a
system of equations using the original mutual liability problem only. Our
main result states that the property of composition guarantees ρϕ(E,C) and
rϕ(E,C) to be equal for any (E,C) ∈ LN .
Theorem 3.2. Let (E,C) ∈ LN and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule that satisfies
composition. Then, ρϕ(E,C) = rϕ(E,C).
Proof. Let {Ek}k∈N, {Ck}k∈N and {Φk}k∈N be the sequences generated by
the ISAP on (E,C) with respect to ϕ. As usual, set Ek = (eki )i∈N , C
k =
(ckij)i,j∈N and Φ
k = (Φkij)i,j∈N . By Lemma 3.1, r
ϕ(E,C) corresponds to a





for all i, j ∈ N . To show that ρϕ(E,C) = rϕ(E,C) it suffices to show that









for all j ∈ N . In order to do so, define





i for all k ∈ N}.
First, let i ∈ B. Since i never has sufficient funds to pay off all remaining





























































































































The fifth equality follows from continuity of ϕ in the estate which stems from
the result that a bankruptcy rule is continuous in the estate if it satisfies
composition.4 The sixth equality follows from applying composition, and
the eighth by repeatedly applying the previous arguments again.





4See, for instance, Claim 1 in Herrero and Villar (2001).
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Thus, ckij = 0 and Φ
k












(ckij − ck+1ij )























































































for all j ∈ N .
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As mentioned before, the Talmud rule τ does not satisfy composition
while the constrained equal awards rule CEA does. Two other well-known
bankruptcy rules, the proportional rule PROP and constrained equal losses
rule CEL, satisfy composition too (cf. Herrero and Villar (2001)).
4 On the invariance of mutual liability rules
To reduce or simplify the analysis of mutual liability problems a rather nat-
ural approach would seem to first settle all bilateral claims before applying
a mutual liability rule. However, the outcome that follows from a mutual
liability rule may change as a result of settling all bilateral claims.
Example 4.1. Reconsider the mutual liability problem (E,C) ∈ LN of




 , and C =
0 1 21 0 1
5 2 0
 .
If the agents were to settle claims bilaterally first, agent 1 pays 1 to agent
2 and 2 to agent 3, agent 2 pays 1 to agent 1 and 1 to agent 3, and agent 3





 , and Č =
0 0 00 0 0
3 1 0
 .
One can readily check that







Note that this allocation is different from ρτ (E,C) = (3, 1, 0) and rτ (E,C) =
(238 , 1
5
8 , 0) as derived in Examples 2.1 and 3.1, respectively. Additionally, the
allocation of the reduced mutual liability problem differs from ρCEA(E,C) =
rCEA(E,C) = (2, 2, 0). 4
We now propose a new reduction method that is based on so-called
bankruptcy-stable sets that guarantees the invariance of any ϕ-based mutual
liability rule. A bankruptcy-stable set is a set of agents such that for every
agent in this set the total claims on other agents in this same set suffice to
19
become debt-free with respect to all agents. In other words, for each agent
in a bankruptcy-stable set, the initial estate plus the claims on other agents
in this same set cover all debts of that agent.









for all i ∈ S. Let S(E,C) denote the set of all bankruptcy-stable sets for
(E,C).
Given (E,C) ∈ LN , either S(E,C) = {∅} or |S(E,C)| ≥ 2. Further-
more, the union of two bankruptcy-stable sets is bankruptcy stable.
Lemma 4.1. Let (E,C) ∈ LN and let S, T ∈ S(E,C). Then, S ∪ T ∈
S(E,C).






















Agents in a bankruptcy-stable set S do not depend on agents outside of
S in order to pay all their debts. Therefore, to reduce or simplify a mutual
liability problem one could let agents in a bankruptcy-stable set S first settle
all bilateral claims among themselves and also pay the full claim to all agents
outside of S.
Definition 4.2. Let (E,C) ∈ LN and let S ∈ S(E,C). The corresponding
reduced mutual liability problem (ES , CS) ∈ LN with ES = (eSi )i∈N and



















0 if i ∈ S and j ∈ N
cij if i ∈ N\S and j ∈ N.
(4.2)
The following example illustrates the reduction method based on bankruptcy-
stable sets.
Example 4.2. Reconsider the mutual liability problem (E,C) ∈ LN of




 , and C =
0 1 21 0 1
5 2 0
 .
Even if agent 3 receives his full claims on agents 1 and 2, he is still not able
to pay off his debts. On the other hand, when agents 1 and 2 receive the full
claim they have on each other it suffices to pay off all their debts. Therefore,
a bankruptcy-stable set is given by S = {1, 2}. The reduced mutual liability




 , and CS =
0 0 00 0 0
5 2 0
 .
Clearly, the allocation vector is equal to
ρτ (ES , CS) = (3, 1, 0) = ρτ (E,C).
However,





, 0) = rτ (E,C).
4
In fact, for any bankruptcy rule ϕ the allocation vector prescribed by
the ϕ-based mutual liability rule for any given mutual liability problem is
invariant with respect to a reduction on any bankruptcy-stable set.
Theorem 4.1. Let (E,C) ∈ LN , let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule and let S ∈
S(E,C). Then, ρϕ(ES , CS) = ρϕ(E,C).
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Proof. Let P̃ = (p̃ij) ∈ RN×N+ be a ϕ-transfer scheme for (ES , CS). Define
P = (pij) ∈ RN×N+ by
pij =
{
cij if i ∈ S and j ∈ N
p̃ij if i ∈ N\S and j ∈ N.
(4.3)
We will prove that P ∈ Pϕ(E,C) and that αP̃ = αP . Then, as a direct
result ρϕ(ES , CS) = ρϕ(E,C).
To show that P ∈ Pϕ(E,C) we have to prove that, for all i ∈ N ,




for all j ∈ N , where c̄i denotes the i-th row of C.
























Second, let i ∈ N\S. Then, with c̄Si denoting the i-th row of CS , for all












































where the second equality follows from the fact that, by definition (see (4.1)
and (4.2)) in the reduced problem (ES , CS), for all i ∈ N\S






for all m ∈ N ; the third equality follows from the fact that, by definition of
CS , cSmi = 0 for all m ∈ S, and consequently p̃mi = 0 for all m ∈ S; the last
but one equality follows from P̃ ∈ Pϕ(ES , CS).
Next, to show that αP̃ = αP we again discriminate between agents in S
and N\S. In both cases we use that p̃ij = 0 for all i ∈ S and j ∈ N , which
readily follows from the fact that cSij = 0 for all i ∈ S and j ∈ N .
















































































































As seen in Example 4.2, the allocation vector prescribed by a recursive ϕ-
based mutual liability rule need not be invariant with respect to a reduction
on a bankruptcy-stable set. However, for every bankruptcy rule ϕ that
satisfies composition, Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.1 imply that invariance
is guaranteed.
Corollary 4.1. Let (E,C) ∈ LN , let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule that satisfies
composition and let S ∈ S(E,C). Then, rϕ(E,C) = rϕ(ES , CS).
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